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## **National Intelligence Daily** (Cable)

26 November 1982

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USSR: Results of Supreme Soviet
The Soviet leadership apparently has decided to defer the
potentially devisive issue of naming a new president.
The Supreme Soviet ended on Wednesday without ap-
pointing a replacement for Brezhnev as president. Until agreement is reached, Presidium First Deputy Chairman
Kuznetsov will perform the duties of chief of state.
Comment: The lack of a decision indicates that
General Secretary Andropov is powerful enough to block the appointment of someone not closely associated with
him. At the same time, he apparently is not yet willing or able to claim the job for himself or an ally.
The session appointed Azarbayjan party boss Aliyev as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.
He has been in the forefront of the drive against cor-
ruption, and his appointment suggests this campaign will intensify. Andropov emphasized the need for discipline
in his speech at the Central Committee meeting earlier this week.
Party secretary Chernenko was named chairman of one of the Supreme Soviet's two foreign affairs commissions.
This is not a full-time job, but it indicates he has assumed some or all of Suslov's responsibilities.
sumed some of all of Susiov's responsibilities.
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USSR-CHINA: Prospects for Troop Reductions  Moscow appears to be establishing the groundwork for a formal offer to negotiate a mutual reduction of troops along the Chinese border.	25X 25X
the Soviets have been speaking publicly in terms of mutual reductions. Last week the editor-in-chief of Pravda was quoted as saying the most likely area of accord would be mutual troop cuts, because both sides would like to reduce the costs of maintaing large numbers of troops on the border. An official of the party's international department had said earlier that a mutual reduction was possible.	25X 25X
Comment: Moscow apparently is unwilling to make the unilateral reductions Beijing is seeking. The Soviet leadership probably wants to bargain for reciprocal measures that would reduce its security concerns about China and enable the USSR to avoid sole responsibility for the tension over this issue. In addition, Soviet leaders may be wary of opposition in the armed forces toward any major unilateral concessions.	25X
//If negotiations on this subject were to begin, they would be long and complicated. Establishing a data base from which reductions could be calculated or agreeing on verification principles would be difficult.//	<sup>*</sup> 25×
//The USSR has more than 400,000 well-equipped troops close to the border on Soviet and Mongolian territory. China has smaller numbers of troops with mostly obsolete equipment directly opposite the Soviet forces, but it has 1.6 million troops in the four military regions adjacent to the USSR and Mongolia.//	25X
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CHINA: National People's Congress	
Beijing will unveil a five-year plan and ratify a new national constitution at the fifth session of the Fifth National People's CongressChina's rubber-stamp parliamentwhich convenes today.	25X
The Standing Committee of the Congress last week announced the agenda for the annual session. Premier Zhao Ziyang will deliver a report on the sixth Five-Year Plan, for 1981-85, which the Congress is to approve. The Congress also is to announce a number of personnel changes and ratify the draft constitution, which has been circulating "for discussion" since April.	25X
Comment: The session is likely to provide details of policy pronouncements left vague at the party congress in September. The Five-Year Plan is the first substantial outline of medium-term economic goals since the 1950s. The plan and the accompanying budget for 1983 probably will reflect decisions on the strengthening of central financial and planning controls and other hotly debated economic issues.	25X
The draft constitution contains several controversial provisions, including the abolition of communes as rural administrative divisions and the reestablishment of the post of state chairman, which Mao abolished during the Cultural Revolution. The constitution also would create a State Central Military Council, but Beijing has not yet defined its powers.	25X
Politburo Standing Committee member Li Xiannian is the favored candidate for state chairman, a largely symbolic post. The composition of the Military Council probably will overlap with the membership of the party's powerful Military Commission.	25X
Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang reportedly told a recent foreign visitor that Ye Jianying, 85, will step down as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Congress. Ye has consistently resisted efforts to separate him from any of his official posts, but his health makes him unable to handle even routine ceremonial duties.	25X

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LEBANON: Challenges to Government Authority  Sporadic violence underscores the inability of the government to impose its authority and threatens eventually to damage the fragile national consensus that emerged with the election of President Jumayyil in September.	<sup>'</sup> 25) <sub>2</sub> 5)
//In the Shuf region, the bodies of nine Christian militiamen were discovered on Tuesday in the town of Ayn Zhalta. The US Embassy reports that rumors are circulating about a buildup of Christian forces in the	
western Shuf in preparation for a retaliatory operation. Phalange militia leaders may think that a decisive victory over the Druze would strengthen their party's political control in the area, where they have little traditional support.//  Comment: The Iranians apparently have not been notably successful in radicalizing Lebanon's Shia Muslims. Nevertheless, incidents such as those early this week discredit the central government, demoralize the Army,	25)
and may encourage some militant Shiites to challenge government authority.  The government has stayed on the sidelines throughout the fighting in the Shuf, because it lacks a credible force to impose order. Jumayyil has chaired several meetings aimed at halting the violence, but thus far no progress has been made toward reconciliation. If Jumayyil cannot negotiate an end to the fighting, religious factions throughout the country will be encouraged to	25)
pursue their own narrow interests.	25)

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TURKEY-GREECE: Worsening Relations	
//The cancellation of a meeting between the Foreign Ministers suggests another period of strai ahead.//	
//The Greek Government on Wednesday of meeting, which had been scheduled for 9 De NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. Ath the cancellation to charges that Turkish a cent days have violated Greek airspace in islands. Greece claims a 10-mile airspace islands, but Turkey recognizes only 6 mile	cember at the ens attributed ircraft in re- the Aegean around its
//On Wednesday the Greeks also called ambassadors from NATO countries other than charged that the violations of Greek airsp before the NATO defense planning meeting n provocations against NATO as well.//	Turkey. They acecoming
//A Turkish Foreign Ministry official on his country's annual military exercise claims that the moratorium negotiated by t ments last Julyin which the Turks agreed ing closer than 10 miles to Greek territor compel Ankara to accept the Greek Governme claims. Turkish Foreign Minister Turkmen counterpart in October, however, that Turk would continue to fly outside the 6-mile 1 ance with international rules.//	in the Aegean, he two govern- to stop fly- ydid not nt's territorial told his Greek ish aircraft
Comment: //Prime Minister Papandreou tainly wants the moratorium to continue, b position to overlook Turkish violations. of Greece's rights in the Aegean has been tor in his domestic popularity. He could dent to request a US security guarantee agin the US-Greek base negotiations now under	ut he is in no His defense the chief fac- use the inci- ainst Turk <u>ey</u>
//Turkey probably also would like to truce. Its actionstaking place just befing of the Foreign Ministersmay have bee put pressure on Athens to engage in seriou	ore the meet- n intended to
//Ankara is likely to interpret the can indication that Papandreou does not wan the dialogue. As a result, more polemics	t to continue
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OAU: Summit Canceled
Efforts to convene the OAU summit in Tripoli collapsed yesterday following the failure by African leaders to break the deadlock over the seating of a Chadian delegation.
Comment: Libyan leader Qadhafi's second failure in four months to accede to the OAU chairmanship is a blow to his prestige and foreign policy goals. It also thwarts his plans to address the UN General Asssembly.
Qadhafi's intransigence on the Chad issue and his denunciation last week of the Franco-African summit in October have antagonized moderate African leaders. This may complicate any further efforts to reconvene the summit in Tripoli.
The Chad issue has widened the rift between OAU radicals and moderates that was spotlighted earlier this year by the Polisario membership controversy, thus further damaging the OAU's effectiveness in dealing with regional disputes. The future of the organization also has been jeopardized by the failure to address administrative matters, including adoption of the annual budget and election of key Secretariat officials.

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USSR-US: Criticism of President's Speech

An authoritative editorial in *Pravda* yesterday contained a personal attack on President Reagan, condemning his administration's arms control policies as one-sided attempts to achieve military superiority. It sought to refute the President's presentation of comparative indices of US and Soviet military strength, denounced the proposed MX program as "counter" to the SALT I and SALT II restrictions against construction of new silos for ICBMs, and said the US negotiating proposals at INF and START were "absurd." On the other hand, the editorial noted that the President's proposed confidence-building measures, particularly regarding notification of missile tests, were positive.

Comment: The tone of the editorial is consistent with General Secretary Andropov's own statement on Monday that alleged US preconditions for progress in arms control and bilateral relations will be rejected. The criticism of the President's arms control policies probably is intended to encourage domestic and foreign pressures on the US to moderate its negotiating positions at START and INF. The condemnation of the MX decision also may be aimed at heightening US Congressional opposition to the MX program.

YUGOSLAVIA: Outbreaks of Nationalist Violence

Croat nationalists at Zagreb University recently terrorized non-Croat students and assaulted a party member who threatened to report them, according to the US Consulate in Zagreb. The faculty of the university is alert for more trouble. The incident was the first student violence in Croatia since the early 1970s. According to newspapers in Belgrade, a homemade bomb exploded on Monday in the capital of Kosovo Province.

Comment: The Croats believe that Belgrade is forcing Croatia to make greater economic sacrifices during the current austerity campaign than other parts of the country. Students are particularly frustrated because of bleak job prospects caused by the economic situation. The bombing in Kosovo is the latest violence in a province where Albanian nationalists have continued to cause serious problems since rioting early last year.

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SPAIN: Socialists' Timetable	
The Spanish parliament will hear socialist lead Gonzalez's program on Tuesday and will then elect his to head the government. Gonzalez's cabinet is expect to be in place by the end of next week. Most of the likely candidates for cabinet positions are moderate Fernando Moran, a prominent socialist intellectual, being touted as foreign minister.	im cted e es.
Comment: Although the Socialists are still und cided on some key economic and foreign policies, Gor probably will unveil a host of symbolic programs to	nzalez

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DVI GARTA - Shi-sharala Waalah	
BULGARIA: Zhivkov's Health	Jan Bhiolean 71 magantle
returned to Sofia after catar	
Zhivkov attended Brezhnev's f sume his full range of duties	s for several weeks. The
Bulgarian leader has had an e years and he also suffers fro	
Comment: Zhivkov's reco Bulgarian officials anticipat	overy has taken longer than
believed to be in good health successful, he should be able	h. If the surgery proves
Zhivkov has not named an heir	r, although Prime Minister
Filipova favorite of the Sober two in the leadership.	<u>JVIELSappears</u> to be num-

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Special Analysis	
JAPAN: Nakasone and His Policies	
//Yasuhiro Nakasone provides a sharp con Prime Minister Suzuki and should prove to be colorful and imaginative prime ministers. Not nationalist whose goal is to win Japan a "post the world community. He also plans to play a strengthening relations with the US. Although to launch an energetic search for solutions and foreign problems before him, he-like his to work within the bounds of the Liberal Demand consensus decisionmaking.//	one of Japan's most akasone is an outspoken sition of greatness" in a personal role in gh Nakasone is likely to the difficult domestic s predecessorwill have
//Spurring the economy will be a diate and difficult tasks facing the He has to win passage during the spec which begins todayof a supplemental government spending and to cover the year. Nakasone has said that both ecfiscal reform are necessary, but he p priority on the latter.//	new Prime Minister. ial Diet session budget to increase deficit for this onomic stimulus and
//Nakasone also will have to add ences with the US over trade and defethat the trade issue has become a polan economic problem. Although he has of knowledge about the subject, he is doing his homework.//	nse. He recognizes itical as well as admitted his lack
Attitudes on Defense	
//The new Prime Minister is much deal with defense matters. He was a of a revitalized military capability a position was politically respectable	vigorous advocate long before such
//As director general of the Defe early 1970s, Nakasone drew up the plan the concept of defending sea lanes up from the home islands. He has acknow may have to spend more than 1 percent	n that originated to 1,000 miles ledged that Japan
om the nome islands. He has acknow have to spend more than 1 percent	ledged that Japan of its GNP to carry

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its share of the defense burden. As a vigorous advocate of a complementary defense relationship with the US, he is more likely to take a positive stance on sharing defense technology than Suzuki.//
//Early in Nakasone's administration, the Foreign Ministry probably will recommend that Japan provide money or materiel for multinational peacekeeping forces in the Middle East. Nakasone is likely to sound out the Arab states before responding to such a proposal. He has a pro-Arab bias, and, during 1974, led efforts to create a new policy more sympathetic toward Arab oil
constraints on Nakasone
//The Prime Minister will be much more active than Suzuki in making decisions on domestic issues and is likely to take early command of foreign policy. Despite his aggressive style, however, he will have to operate under certain constraints.//
//With local and national elections scheduled for next spring and summer, Nakasone probably will not take any action on sensitive issues that might alienate the voters. He has to be particularly careful on the issue of defense. Because of his reputation as a "hawk," he is keenly aware every comment he makes on defense will be scrutinized by the press.//
//Another serious constraint on Nakasone's activity will come from within his own party. He is indebted to former Prime Ministers Tanaka and Suzuki, and both of them will try to maintain their influence in his administration.//
//Tanaka remains one of the most powerful figures in Japanese politics, although he has been on trial for six years for involvement in the Lockheed bribery scandal. The prosecutor's recommendation for a stiff sentence is expected in early 1983, with a final verdict sometime in late 1983 or early 1984.//
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//Nakasone may believe it necessary to dissociate himself from Tanaka  The Prime Minister  will have a difficult path to walk between alienating Tanaka and appearing to be his puppet.//  //The degree of support Nakasone has from the bureaucracy and the business community also will influence his effectiveness. Most major business leaders favored his election, and he probably can count on their support.//  //Nakasone may have less success with his efforts to win the backing of the powerful bureaucracy. As a career politician, he has no longstanding contacts in the ministries.  Relations With the US  //If the Liberal Democratic Party does well at the polls in 1983 and if Nakasone is able to control factional infighting, he will have more room to demonstrate his decisiveness and creativity. He is a persuasive champion of his chosen projects, and all signs indicate that one of those projects will be shoring up relations with the US. Nakasone believes he understands Americans		Top Secret	25)
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nate role. At the same time, he might propose more imaginative solutions to bilateral problems than have	expressing displeasure when he thinking too hard. He has always been sethat give the impression of placing nate role. At the same time, he might imaginative solutions to bilateral process.	ks Washington is push- ensitive to policies Japan in a subordi- ght propose more	· ¹25)

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